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GIMP THEORY AND THE ADA’S “FEEDBACK LOOP” 
MELISSA COLE ESSIG* 
As a young employment attorney beginning her practice in 1994, it was 
inevitable that I would one day inherit The Notebook.  The Notebook was a 
thin binder— perhaps two inches thick— containing a meager assortment of 
documents designed to make its possessor the firm’s “expert” on the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1  Because the ADA had been signed 
into law a scant four years before, none of the firm’s partners could offer much 
guidance on what it meant or how it worked.  Instead, the designated associate 
would take possession of The Notebook and try her best when one of the 
partners called with a question about disability discrimination. 
The truth is that I didn’t know what to make of The Notebook’s contents.  
As far as I can recall, it contained only some photocopies of the regulations 
interpreting Title I of the ADA2 and perhaps some EEOC Interpretive 
Guidance on those regulations.3  I had neglected to take Administrative Law in 
law school, so I must confess that I didn’t see the importance of these 
materials.  Instead, I relied on my knowledge of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 19644 as my primary guidance in interpreting and applying Title I of the 
ADA.5 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Whittier Law School.  My thanks to the members of the St. 
Louis University Law Journal and to my former colleagues at the St. Louis University School of 
Law for welcoming me back to participate in this rich discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
forty years later.  I am truly flattered to be in the company of such important contributors to the 
continuing struggle for equality. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
213 (2000)). 
 2. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1–1630.16 (2001). 
 3. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 App. (2001). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). 
 5. Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2000), covers employment discrimination, a 
practice area at my firm.  Title II, id. at §§ 12131–34, 12141–50, applies to public entities (state 
and local governments and their agencies), and Title III, id. at §§ 12181–89, applies to public 
accommodations. 
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My method was not as naive as it may sound.  The ADA was, after all, 
largely modeled on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6  It was only later, when I 
entered academia and began thinking more critically about the ADA, that I 
began to consider the profound differences between disability discrimination 
and race discrimination and how those differences might affect implementation 
of the ADA.  As I set out to employ critical theory to unpack the limitations of 
the law, I realized that Critical Race Theory, while highly useful in explaining 
why the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has fallen short of its goal,7 fails to similarly 
explain why the ADA has had limited success in fighting disability 
discrimination.8 
Instead, I began to use what I call “Gimp Theory,”9 a post-structuralist 
approach to disability that draws greatly upon Queer Theory.10  In Gimp 
Theory, the same issues of physiognomy, conduct, and closeting that inform 
Queer Theory help to explain both how society perceives and creates the 
concept of disability and, equally importantly, how the ADA as interpreted and 
applied in fact guarantees the continued subordination of people with 
disabilities.  In particular, I noted how the same distinction between status—
which receives legal protection—and conduct—which does not—that 
characterizes the legal treatment of lesbians and gay men likewise explains the 
legal treatment of people with disabilities under the ADA.11 
It was with great interest, then, that I read the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas,12 wherein the Court abandoned the status/conduct 
distinction between legal protection and lack of it for gay men and lesbians.  
 
 6. Although the ADA explicitly references the regulatory and case law history of § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1972, 29 U.S.C. § 794, Section 504 was patterned on Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987). 
 7. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 CAL. L. REV. 597 
(1991); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstruction Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987). 
 8. I explored this difference in Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation and the Sutton 
Court’s Closeting of Disabilities, 43 HOW. L.J. 499, 512–18 (2000). 
 9. The artist Dan Keplenger, who has cerebral palsy, explains in the documentary film 
“King Gimp” that “[m]ost people think ‘gimp’ means someone with a lame walk.  But ‘gimp’ 
also means a ‘fighting spirit.’”  KING GIMP (HBO Films 1999). 
 10. See Cole, supra note 8, at 518–31; Melissa Cole, In/Ensuring Disability, 77 TUL. L. REV. 
839, 842–57 (2003). 
 11. See Cole, supra note 8, at 531–42 (examining how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the ADA in Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), forced people who are able to do so 
to closet their disabilities and thus be treated as if they did not have such disabilities); see also 
Cole, supra note 10, at 868–83 (explaining how the courts’ interpretation of the ADA’s “safe 
harbor provision” for insurers and health insurance plans requires individuals with disabilities to 
cover their disabilities—that is, maintain their status as individuals with disabilities but hide 
important correlative behavior). 
 12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Instead, the Lawrence Court drew a new distinction between private, intimate 
conduct that is legally protected and public conduct that is not.13 
The private/public dichotomy is particularly intriguing when incorporated 
into Gimp Theory’s critical examination of disability law.  While the 
status/conduct framework produced some inconsistency in explaining the 
Court’s ADA cases, the private/public framework provides a more complete, 
although no less troubling, picture of just how and why the Court has 
consistently limited the reach of the ADA and, in doing so, reinforced the 
subordinate position of people with disabilities. 
In particular, while the ADA, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is designed 
to provide public protection against discrimination, implicit in the Court’s 
reading of the ADA is the message that public conduct associated with 
disability is not protected.  A critical examination of the Court’s ADA cases 
employing the private/public framework shows that the Court views the ADA 
as protecting only private conduct; it thus simultaneously creates the 
appearance of supporting the civil rights of people with disabilities—as long as 
those rights are confined to private spaces—and in reality leaches those rights, 
which demand public expression, of any substance. 
To be clear at the outset, in this piece I employ the status/conduct and 
private/public theoretical frameworks to understand the inherent flaws in the 
Court’s ADA opinions.  I do not claim to explain how the Justices meant to 
interpret the ADA; they all had legal bases (some more sound than others) for 
their opinions.  The point of using theory to examine legal opinions is to 
uncover the often unintended biases that inform purportedly neutral 
applications of the law.  Theory seeks to go beyond politics, which are at least 
semi-conscious.  Instead, I use Gimp Theory to explain how disability as a 
category of subordination (and therefore, in legal terms, a class in need of civil 
rights protections) both informs and is reinforced by the very law meant to 
provide redress for such subordination.  Without exposing and examining the 
biases inherent in the interpretation and application of the ADA, it is all too 
easy to assume that they do not exist, and our explanations for the flaws in the 
Court’s understanding of the ADA remain inadequate. 
I start in Part I of this piece by explaining the status/conduct distinction 
that, until Lawrence, informed both the legal treatment of lesbians and gay 
men and, as explained by Gimp Theory, the way the Court has interpreted the 
ADA.  I show how the Court’s ADA opinions reflect an approach that protects 
disability status without protecting the conduct that cannot be separated from 
disability status—much as the act of sodomy (which, until Lawrence, was not 
legally protected) cannot be meaningfully distinguished from gay and lesbian 
status (which did receive constitutional protection).  In Part II, I provide a close 
reading of Lawrence to show that, although the Court recognized the 
 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
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artificiality of its old status/conduct dichotomy, it merely imposed a new 
dichotomy of protection for private homosexual conduct and lack of legal 
protection for such public conduct.  I explain how the same private/public 
distinction applies to disability—between private acts of caring for one’s 
bodily disability and public conduct such as requiring reasonable 
accommodations.  Finally, in Part III, I re-examine the ADA cases using the 
private/public framework and find it a more satisfying explanation for the 
Court’s constricted interpretation of the ADA, as well as a troubling gutting of 
the civil rights protections that the ADA ought to guarantee. 
I.  GIMP THEORY AND THE OLD STATUS/CONDUCT DISTINCTION 
Gimp Theory borrows from Queer Theory the use of paradigms of 
“closeting” and “covering” to illuminate the instability and inherent 
meaninglessness of the legal line drawn between people with disabilities and 
those without.  In the context of homosexuality, these paradigms explain the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Bowers v. Hardwick14 and Romer v. Evans.15  
Understanding these opinions as examples of “closeting” and “covering,” 
respectively, also demonstrates how these theoretical constructs can be used to 
explain the Court’s treatment of the ADA. 
A. The Closeting Paradigm and the ADA 
In Bowers, a majority of the court held that gay and lesbian conduct—
specifically, sodomy—is not constitutionally protected and, therefore, may be 
criminalized by the states.16  Traditionally, this legal imperative to hide one’s 
identifying conduct was seen as “closeting,”17 a silencing of certain conduct 
that thus assumes the mantle of the socially unacceptable and transforms those 
who engage in it into social deviants.18 
The societal expectation that people who can keep their disability hidden 
will keep it hidden operates as a similar sort of “closeting.” It assumes a false 
line between a state of disapproved disability—the characteristic of those who 
 
 14. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 15. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 16. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192, 196. 
 17. See, e.g., GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK 25 (1994) (chronicling the rise of the 
state-imposed closet which “literally codified the permissible speech patterns, dress, and 
demeanor of [gay] men and women who wished to socialize in public”). 
 18. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 8 (1990) (“[T]hese 
ignorances, far from being pieces of the originary dark, are produced by and correspond to 
particular knowledges and circulate as part of particular regimes of truth.”); Iris Marion Young, 
The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 300, 303 
(Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (“Any move to define an identity, a closed totality, always 
depends on excluding some elements, separating the pure from the impure.”). 
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cannot hide their impairment 19—and a state of “normal” able-bodiedness—the 
characteristic of people whose impairments are not noticeable—and reinforces 
this very socially created difference.20  The Supreme Court has drawn this line 
between apparent and closeted disabilities to restrict the number of people 
considered to have disabilities and in this way has limited the ADA’s 
protection against discrimination by removing countless people from its 
coverage.  From its earliest ADA decisions, the Supreme Court has therefore 
sanctioned and furthered the unacknowledged construction of a disability 
closet. 
Although the Court’s first ADA decision, Bragdon v. Abbott, quite 
correctly held that the ADA provides protection against discrimination for 
people with asymptomatic HIV infection,21 it is notable that Sidney Abbott’s 
asymptomatic HIV was a quintessentially hidden disability, one that others 
would not be aware of absent her disclosure.22  Because Sidney Abbott’s HIV 
was asymptomatic, she fit the paradigm of the closet.  In arguing exclusively 
that her impairment substantially limited her major life activity of 
reproduction,23 Abbott most likely was conceding that it did not affect her in 
any of her other major life activities.24  In other words, had she not revealed 
 
 19. I do not necessarily mean being able to render a disability physically invisible, but rather 
socially invisible.  For example, even a prototypical disability like blindness can be “hidden” if 
one tries to erase any differences that could provoke anxiety in another person.  See Jean 
Campbell & Caroline L. Kaufmann, Equality and Difference in the ADA: Unintended 
Consequences for Employment of People with Mental Health Disabilities, in MENTAL DISORDER, 
WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 221, 230 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997) 
(“People frequently say, ‘I don’t consider you disabled.’ That’s because I make accommodations 
to my [blindness]. . . . I’m accommodating all the time, but they don’t know or realize it.”). 
 20. See Robert Murphy, Encounters: The Body Silent in America, in DISABILITY AND 
CULTURE 140, 146 (Benedicte Ingstad & Susan Reynolds Whyte eds., 1995) (“Most 
Americans . . . carry around inside their heads a set of notions about the social position of the 
handicapped. . . . [T]his attitude places the disabled not in the social mainstream but on the 
periphery, pensioned off and largely out of sight.”). 
 21. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).  The Court specifically held that Sidney 
Abbott’s HIV infection rendered her an individual with a disability within the Act’s definition.  It 
did “not address . . . whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA.”  Id. at 641–42.  
The Court’s opinion, however, makes it clear that HIV infection inevitably substantially limits 
major life activities as required by the statute.  Id. at 637 (noting amici arguments “about HIV’s 
profound impact on almost every phase of the infected person’s life”). 
 22. The only reason Dr. Bragdon knew about her HIV status was because she disclosed it on 
a patient form.  Id. at 628–29. 
 23. Id. at 638. 
 24. The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of [the] individual,” or as having “a record of such 
an impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an impairment.”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) 
(2000). 
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her disability to Dr. Bragdon, he would never have known about it.25  She did 
not announce herself as a person with a disability. 
The Bragdon Court’s opinion focuses on the hidden nature of HIV 
infection, describing its internal manifestations over several pages of text.26  
Abbott’s claim that her infection substantially limited her ability to reproduce 
allowed the Court to confront a disability that affected no one but Abbott 
herself and perhaps her potential sexual partners;27 certainly, her HIV infection 
appeared to have no outward manifestations.  She therefore could remain 
closeted, a person with a disability who appeared to be a person without a 
disability.  Abbott did not require any accommodation of her disability; 
instead, she brought the suit because she wanted to be treated as all other 
patients by having a cavity filled in her dentist’s office rather than at a 
hospital.28  The Court’s holding was arguably possible because it required 
nothing more of Dr. Bragdon than that he refrain from discriminating against a 
person whose status but not her conduct identified her as a person with a 
disability.29 
The following year, the Court reinforced this preference for closeted 
disabilities in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation.30  In a 
unanimous opinion, the Cleveland Court held that a person who identifies 
herself on a Social Security application as having a disability that renders her 
unable to work—who “comes out,” as it were—“will appear to negate an 
essential element of her ADA case,”31 that she could “perform the essential 
functions” of the job “with or without reasonable accommodation.”32  Thus, 
any person who “comes out” by publicly identifying herself as a person with a 
disability on an application for Social Security must “proffer a sufficient 
explanation” to convince a court that she is entitled to the protections of the 
ADA.33  Again, in accordance with the closet, the Court mandated protection 
for disability status at the expense of visible conduct. 
 
 25. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628–29 (“She disclosed her HIV infection on the patient 
registration form.”). 
 26. Id. at 633–36. 
 27. The Court noted the risk of transmission to a partner as one way in which Abbott was 
substantially limited in her ability to reproduce. Id. at 639–40.  But the Court placed much more 
emphasis on the risk of perinatal transmission to the children she would not have.  Id. at 640–41. 
 28. Id. at 629. 
 29. Even that holding was qualified; the Court acknowledged that Abbott might not be 
entitled to the equal treatment she sought when it remanded the case for consideration of Dr. 
Bragdon’s direct threat defense.  Id. at 654–55. 
 30. 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 
 31. Id. at 806. 
 32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (defining “qualified individual with a disability”). 
 33. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806. The Cleveland opinion applies directly only to Title I of the 
ADA because Title I is the only Title that requires one be able to work in order to qualify for 
protection.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against a “qualified individual 
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In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.  v. Williams,34 the Court 
directly stated a preference for closeting.  There, Williams claimed that her 
carpal tunnel syndrome substantially limited her in performing manual tasks.35  
The Court held that to claim a disability, one must be substantially limited in 
her ability to perform tasks that are “central to daily life,”36 not in her ability 
“to perform the tasks associated with her specific job.”37  The opinion 
explained that “the manual tasks unique to any particular job are not 
necessarily important parts of most people’s lives.  As a result, occupation-
specific tasks may have only limited relevance to the manual task inquiry.”38 
Certainly, one could read the opinion as focusing on the “occupation-
specific” nature of Williams’s limitations.  However, she worked on an 
assembly line,39 and the manual tasks she performed at work were therefore 
not particularly unique.  The line the Court drew was not between different 
types of tasks at the workplace but between those tasks performed at work and 
those at home, a difference between limitations that will be seen by others and 
therefore identify one as a person with a disability and limitations that one can 
keep hidden from public view.40  In the same way it did in Bragdon and 
Cleveland, the Williams Court ensured that to receive the ADA’s protection 
against disability discrimination, one should remain closeted. 
The Court’s closeting of disability took a different and apparently 
inconsistent turn in the 1999 “mitigation” trilogy: Sutton v. United Air Lines, 
Inc.,41 Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,42 and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc.43  In these cases, the Court went beyond expressing a preference that 
 
with a disability”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining “qualified individual with a disability” as “an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires”). The point, 
however, is not the narrow one that a statement made of inability to work on a Social Security 
application may remove one from ADA protection; rather, the use of the critical theory of the 
closet reveals the larger implication of this opinion that public statement as a person with a 
disability may deny one protection against disability discrimination. 
 34. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 35. Id. at 190.  The regulations relied upon by the Court, id. at 195, include performing 
manual tasks as an example of a “major life activity” in which one must be “substantially limited” 
in order to be considered a person with a disability entitled to the protections of the ADA.  See 45 
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2001). 
 36. Williams, 534 U.S. at 197. 
 37. Id. at 200–01. 
 38. Id. at 201. 
 39. Id. at 187. 
 40. See id. at 201–02 (remanding to the Court of Appeals to consider evidence of the effect 
Williams’s carpal tunnel syndrome had on her ability to perform her personal hygiene and 
household chores). 
 41. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 42. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
 43. 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1054 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1047 
people with disabilities remain closeted and held, ironically, that if they do so 
through the use of medications or other devices that alleviate disabling 
symptoms, they no longer have disabilities and are not entitled to the ADA’s 
protection.44 
In Sutton—the infamous case of the nearsighted twin sister commercial 
airline pilots45—the Court held that the plaintiffs’ ability to correct their 
“severe myopia”46 with the use of contact lenses or glasses removed them from 
the protection against discrimination that they received in their uncorrected 
state.47  The majority based its holding largely on the Congressional findings in 
the ADA’s preamble that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more 
physical or mental disabilities.”48  By recasting this finding as an outer limit 
for the number of people the Act should protect,49 the Court closeted everyone 
beyond this limit and deemed them people who could not be legally treated as 
individuals with disabilities.50 
Murphy and Kirkingburg reinforced and extended Sutton’s relegation of 
people with mitigable disabilities to the closet and therefore out of the 
protected status of people with disabilities.51  Vaughn Murphy lost ADA 
protection for his hypertension as soon as he began taking medication to 
control it and thus render its presence invisible, placing him in the closet.52  
Even Hallie Kirkingburg’s ability to compensate for his monocular vision 
without the use of corrective aids removed him from the ADA’s ambit; he 
closeted himself so successfully that no one would perceive his “difference.”53  
 
 44. See Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565–66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482–
83 (“A person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures 
does not have an impairment that presently ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity.”). 
 45. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. 
 46. Each woman’s vision was 20/200 in her right eye and 20/400 in her left eye.  Id. 
 47. Id. at 488–89. 
 48. Id. at 484 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994)). 
 49. See id. at 487 (“By contrast, nonfunctional approaches to defining disability produce 
significantly larger numbers.”). 
 50. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487 (“Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected 
physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much 
higher number of disabled persons in the findings.  That it did not is evidence that the ADA’s 
coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective 
measures.”); see also id. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (relying on this Congressional finding 
as one of the “strongest clues” to the Act’s coverage along with another provision’s description of 
people with disabilities as “a discrete and insular minority” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) 
(1994))). 
 51. Of course, gay/lesbian closeting operates as a mode of protection from legal persecution, 
while for people with disabilities the closet serves to remove the legal protections of the ADA.  
However, as the Sutton opinion demonstrates, closeting a disability, like closeting one’s sexuality, 
removes it from view and thus creates what appears to be a larger normative “majority.” 
 52. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999). 
 53. Alberton’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] GIMP THEORY AND THE ADA’S “FEEDBACK LOOP” 1055 
When he “came out” by disclosing his disability to his employer, they were 
free to fire him without legal sanctions.  By creating this closet and then 
relegating countless numbers of people with disabilities to it by virtue of their 
ability to mitigate, the Court shrank the number of people who could claim 
disability status and thus limited protection for it.54 
Finally, one of the Court’s most recent ADA decisions, Raytheon 
Company v. Hernandez,55 illustrates the Court’s growing comfort with the 
closeting imperative of its construction of the ADA and also illustrates how 
this closeting continues to remove people from the Act’s coverage and thus 
limits disability status protection.  Raytheon involved Title I of the ADA’s 
provisions on drug and alcohol addiction.56  Under these provisions, alcoholics 
are covered by the Act, but only if they keep their alcoholism closeted.  People 
with other drug addictions are expressly exempted from coverage, but 
recovering addicts—those who are able to hide or closet their addiction—are 
accorded disability status protection.57  At the same time, employers are 
allowed to take action against recovering alcoholic or drug addicted employees 
for conduct that is “related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee.”58  
 
 54. See Sutton, 527 U.S.  at 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
If a narrow reading of the term “disability” were necessary in order to avoid the danger 
that the Act might otherwise force United to hire pilots who might endanger the lives of 
their passengers, it would make good sense to use the “43,000,000 Americans” finding to 
confine its coverage.  There is, however, no such danger in this case. 
Id. According to Justice Stevens, even if granted disability status, the Suttons would still have to 
prove that United’s refusal to hire them was taken “because of” their disability, and “an employer 
may avoid liability if it shows that the criteri[on] . . . is ‘job-related and consistent with business 
necessity’ or . . . [the disability] would pose a health or safety hazard.” Id.; see also  Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational 
Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 942–43 (2004) (noting that Albertson’s argument that they 
fired Kirkingburg because DOT regulations presumably identified him as an unsafe driver due to 
his monocular vision was invalid because Kirkingburg received a waiver under a program that 
showed the government was “expressing uncertainty about whether that previous [regulatory] 
statement was true”). 
 55. 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
 56. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2000). 
 57. Id. § 12114(a).  Congress’s determination that people with drug addictions are exempt 
from coverage unless they are currently undergoing or have completed rehabilitation, id. § 
12114(b), while people with alcohol addiction need not be in recovery to receive ADA protection, 
id. § 12114(a), plainly reflects a social judgment about drug abuse versus alcoholism.  Titles II 
and III do not address alcoholism at all, but the DOJ regulations interpreting them expressly 
exempt current drug users from coverage while allowing protection for people who are in or have 
completed drug addiction rehabilitation.  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.131(a)(2)(i)(ii), 36.209(a)(2)(i)(ii) 
(2001). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2000).  The EEOC’s Technical Assistance Manual explains: 
If an individual who has alcoholism often is late to work or is unable to perform the 
responsibilities of his/her job, an employer can take disciplinary action on the basis of the 
poor job performance and conduct.  However, an employer may not discipline an 
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In other words, alcoholics or recovering addicts are protected as long as they 
remain closeted; if they reveal themselves as alcoholics or drug addicts by 
coming to work intoxicated or stoned, they are no longer protected against 
discrimination. 
In Raytheon, Hernandez was fired when a company drug test came back 
positive for cocaine.  Two years later, successfully in recovery, he applied for a 
new position with Raytheon.  The company refused to hire him based on its 
policy against rehiring people who had previously been fired for workplace 
misconduct.59  The district court granted Raytheon’s motion for summary 
judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed because it recognized that 
Raytheon’s policy promoted discrimination against people with closeted 
disabilities.  According to the Court of Appeals, “[m]aintaining a blanket 
policy against rehire of all former employees who violated company policy . . . 
screens out persons with a record of addiction who have successfully 
rehabilitated.”60 
The Supreme Court remanded the case on the purely legal basis that the 
Court of Appeals had improperly mixed the “disparate treatment” and 
“disparate impact” modes of discrimination analysis.61  In doing so, however, 
it held that if Raytheon “did indeed apply a neutral, generally applicable no-
rehire policy in rejecting [Hernandez’s] application, [Raytheon’s] decision not 
to rehire [him] can, in no way, be said to have been motivated by [his] 
disability” and therefore would fail under the disparate treatment (intentional 
discrimination) theory of the case.62  In other words, if Hernandez was 
successfully in recovery, as necessary for him to fall within the Act’s 
protections,63 the very fact that he was thus closeted ensured that Raytheon 
could not be found to have intentionally discriminated against him for a 
disability they purportedly did not know he had.64 
In these cases, the Court employed two modes of closeting that 
paradoxically limit the ADA’s protection for disability status.  In Bragdon, 
Cleveland, and Williams it expressed a preference for the closet, wherein 
 
alcoholic employee more severely than it does other employees for the same performance 
or conduct. 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, VIII-3 (1992). 
 59. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 46. 
 60. Id. at 51 (quoting Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1036–37 (9th 
Cir. 2002)). 
 61. Id. at 56. 
 62. Id. at 55. 
 63. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a)–(b)(2)(2000). 
 64. The person who made the determination that Hernandez was not eligible for 
reemployment testified “that she did not know that [he] was a former drug addict when she made 
the employment decision and did not see anything that would constitute a ‘record of’ addiction.”  
Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] GIMP THEORY AND THE ADA’S “FEEDBACK LOOP” 1057 
disability status does not require extensive public protection.  In Sutton, 
Kirkingburg, Murphy, and Raytheon, it removed legal protections for people in 
the closet on the basis that they no longer could claim disability status.  The 
closet thus grew to enclose greater numbers of people with disabilities and then 
shrank out of sight. 
B. The Covering Paradigm and the ADA 
While “closeting” helps explain the larger implications of the Court’s 
disability status cases, the Queer Theory concept of “covering” provides 
insight into the Court’s disability conduct cases, those dealing with reasonable 
accommodations and choice of work.  The concept of “covering” has been 
developed by Professor Kenji Yoshino to explain the social and legal effects of 
American society’s growing tolerance of gay men and lesbians.65  According 
to Yoshino, this growing tolerance has lessened the expectation that lesbians 
and gay men closet themselves but has replaced it with the expectation that 
they “cover,” or refrain from publicly engaging in conduct that is closely 
associated with gayness and therefore serves as a reminder of a person’s gay or 
lesbian status.66  In other words, the closet door may be open, but people are 
expected to leave their gay/lesbian clothing inside. 
This move from the closet to covering is reflected in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Romer v. Evans.67  There, the majority struck down as 
unconstitutional an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that 
prohibited any governmental legal protection for gay men and lesbians as a 
class.68  The Court held the amendment in conflict with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution because it “singl[ed] out a certain class of citizens 
for disfavored legal status.”69  The difference between Romer and Bowers 
therefore revolved around the status/conduct distinction: Romer struck down a 
state constitutional amendment that discriminated on the basis of status, while 
Bowers approved of a state statute purporting to punish only conduct.70 
Several of the Court’s ADA cases follow a similar line of reasoning, 
protecting disability status but offering limited guarantees for people with 
disabilities to engage in conduct constitutive of that status.  For example, in US 
 
 65. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 775 (2002). 
 66. Id. at 874–75. 
 67. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 68. Id. at 623–24. 
 69. Id. at 633. 
 70. For another case involving the status/conduct distinction, see Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 
530 U.S. 640, 676 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority incorrectly held the 
Boy Scouts of America’s (BSA) action legal because they expelled Dale for engaging in gay 
conduct when “BSA said it did so because of his sexual orientation, not because of his sexual 
conduct”). 
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Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,71 the Court recognized that the ADA’s “reasonable 
accommodation” obligation might require that people with disabilities be 
allowed to conduct themselves differently in order to maintain their status 
protection but defined this possibility very narrowly.72  There, Barnett 
requested—as a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA73—that his 
employer allow him to maintain his position in the mail room after being 
injured in a cargo handling position, despite the fact that other employees with 
greater seniority had a prior right to the position.74 
Although the Court recognized that a reasonable accommodation might 
require Barnett’s employer to grant him the position in violation of the 
established seniority system, it suggested that his right to engage in such 
conduct—working in the mailroom—was unlikely.  According to the Court, 
“ordinarily”75 an employer would not be required to make such an 
accommodation because of the possible impact it might have on other 
employees’ expectations.76  The person with a disability bears the burden of 
demonstrating “special circumstances” that prove his conduct does not affect 
other employees.77 
In other words, the Court expressed the expectation (both its own and that 
of other employees) that individuals with disabilities “cover” by refraining 
from engaging in conduct (such as requesting reasonable accommodations) 
that would require others to confront their disability status.  By thus narrowing 
 
 71. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
 72. Id. at 397 (“The Act requires preferences in the form of ‘reasonable accommodations’ 
that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those 
without disabilities automatically enjoy.”).  See Bagenstos, supra note 54, at 948 (“The centrality 
of ‘reasonable accommodation’ to the ADA’s nondiscrimination scheme sends the message that 
disability is different from other forbidden classifications precisely because it is often relevant to 
one’s ability to do the job.”). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 74. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393–94. 
 75. Id. at 403. 
 76. Id. at 404 (“Most important for present purposes, to require the typical employer to show 
more than the existence of a seniority system might well undermine the employees’ expectations 
of consistent, uniform treatment—expectations upon which the seniority system’s benefits 
depend.”). 
 77. Id. at 405.  The Court explained: 
The plaintiff might show, for example, that the employer, having retained the right to 
change the seniority system unilaterally, exercises that right fairly frequently, reducing 
employee expectations that the system will be followed—to the point where one more 
departure, needed to accommodate an individual with a disability, will not likely make a 
difference. 
Id. 
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the scope of the ADA’s reasonable accommodations provision, the Court 
broadened the scope of expected covering by people with disabilities.78 
Notably, Justice Scalia would have restricted the reasonable 
accommodation obligation even more severely.  In his Barnett dissent, he 
argued that no reasonable accommodation would ever require any change to 
any workplace rule that does not pose a “distinctive obstacle to the disabled.”79  
Justice Scalia thus wholeheartedly embraced covering by claiming that the 
ADA might protect disability status but does not allow employees with 
disabilities to engage in any conduct that disturbs a status quo that is not 
facially discriminatory. 
In its other accommodation decision, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,80 the Court 
shifted its attention from the individual with a disability’s request for 
reasonable accommodation to the defense that the accommodation, even if 
reasonable, would impose a “fundamental alteration” on the defendant’s 
programs.81  The Martin Court held that professional golfer Casey Martin’s 
request that he be allowed to use a golf cart during the last stage of a qualifying 
tournament for the PGA Tour would not fundamentally alter the tournament, 
despite the fact that other players are required to walk the course.82  The 
majority found the no-golf-cart rule “peripheral” and, therefore, held that 
waiving the requirement for Martin would not fundamentally alter the 
tournament.83 
The unusual facts in Martin made the opinion possible within the covering 
paradigm.  The majority plainly viewed Martin as exceptional.  According to 
the Court, “Congress intended that an entity like the PGA . . . give 
individualized attention to the handful of requests that it might receive from 
talented but disabled athletes.”84  Allowing Martin to use a golf cart was 
therefore unlikely to expand the range of protected conduct in general since it 
 
 78. See id. at 420 (Souter, J., dissenting) (pointing out that Title I of the ADA expressly 
includes “reassignment to a vacant position” as one type of reasonable accommodation, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(9) (1994), and that “[n]othing in the ADA insulates seniority rules from the ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ requirement, in marked contrast to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, each of which has an explicit protection for 
seniority.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1994))). 
 79. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 80. 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
 81. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Title III, at issue in Martin); see also 28 C.F.R. § 
35.130(b)(7) (2004) (regulations implementing Title II of the ADA).  Title I provides a defense of 
“undue hardship” instead of “fundamental alteration.”  42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(10). 
The Martin opinion also considered whether the PGA Tour is a “public accommodation” covered 
by Title III of the ADA, an issue not relevant to this discussion.  Martin, 532 U.S. at 674–77. 
 82. Martin, 532 U.S. at 690. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 691. 
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seemed unlikely that there would be many other professional athletes with 
physical disabilities requiring a change in the rules.85 
Furthermore, in contrast to Barnett, Martin’s accommodation would have 
no effect on other players.  According to the district court findings relied upon 
by the majority, Martin suffered far greater fatigue even when using a golf cart 
than other players did when walking.86  The accommodation therefore more 
closely resembled covering.  Martin’s disability status was accepted and his 
conduct acceptable because it did not disturb others. 
Perhaps most important, the majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, a 
lifelong golfer, paid great attention to the ways in which Martin covered his 
disability.  The opinion included a lengthy discussion of the pain Martin 
endures when walking even the short distance from the cart to the hole,87 along 
with a catalogue of what he has achieved despite his disability.88  Relying 
heavily on the district court’s finding that Martin “easily endures greater 
fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by walking,”89 the 
Court was able to present Martin’s request for a waiver of the no-golf-cart rule 
as minor because he was already covering.  Indeed, in the first two rounds of 
the qualifying tournament, anyone was allowed to use a golf cart;90 at that 
point, Martin “looked” like a person without a disability.  Disallowing golf 
carts in the final round thus did not define how golfers act because many had 
used carts in the previous rounds (and in all rounds prior to 1997, when the no-
golf-cart rule was initiated).91  Martin therefore conducted himself like a 
golfer, even using a cart, not like a golfer with a disability. 
Dissenting once again, Justice Scalia advocated a much broader range of 
covering, claiming that the ADA requires only that “disabled individuals must 
 
 85. Oddly enough, while Martin’s suit was pending, another professional golfer, Ford 
Olinger, unsuccessfully sued the U.S. Golf Association in the Seventh Circuit for its refusal to 
provide him with a golf cart as an accommodation of his disability as well.  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari but, without an opinion after deciding Martin, vacated the judgment against 
Olinger.  Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass’n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated, 532 U.S. 1064 (2001). 
 86. Martin, 532 U.S. at 690. 
 87. Id. at 668 (noting that because of his condition, for Martin “[w]alking not only caused 
him pain, fatigue, and anxiety, but also created a significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing 
blood clots, and fracturing his tibia so badly that an amputation might be required”).  The district 
court found that 
plaintiff is in significant pain when he walks, and even when he is getting in and out of 
the cart.  With each step, he is at risk of fracturing his tibia and hemorrhaging. . . . As he 
put it, he would gladly trade the cart for a good leg.  To perceive that the cart puts him—
with his condition—at a competitive advantage is a gross distortion of reality. 
Id. at 672 (quoting the district court). 
 88. Id. at 667–68. 
 89. Id. at 690. 
 90. Id. at 666. 
 91. Martin, 532 U.S. at 666. 
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be given access to the same goods, services, and privileges that others 
enjoy.”92  Under this formulation, the PGA could enact any rules it chose, as 
long as it imposed them equally on all players.93  “The PGA Tour cannot deny 
respondent access to that game because of his disability, but it need not 
provide him a game different (whether in its essentials or in its details) from 
that offered to everyone else.”94  Justice Scalia therefore apparently reads the 
ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement as providing absolutely no 
conduct protection.95 
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal,96 a unanimous Court acknowledged 
that its covering expectation is in fact much broader than it may have appeared 
in the Martin decision.  In Echazabal, the Court determined that, although on 
its face the ADA creates an affirmative defense for employer-imposed job 
qualifications requiring that an individual with a disability not pose a direct 
threat to the health or safety of “other individuals in the workplace,”97 an 
employer could also successfully defend an employment decision made 
 
 92. Id. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. at 699 (“If a shoe store wishes to sell shoes only in pairs it may; and if a golf tour (or 
a golf course) wishes to provide only walk-around golf, it may.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. The “access” argument, of course, completely ignores the reasonable accommodation 
mandate of the ADA, which plainly recognizes that access alone will not allow individuals with 
disabilities the equal opportunity that is the Act’s goal.  See Carlos A. Ball, Preferential 
Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. 
L. REV. 951, 955 (2004) (“The most important principle of disability discrimination law, namely, 
that of reasonable accommodation, . . . operates under a difference model of equality, one which 
acknowledges differential treatment of disabled individuals is often necessary in order to provide 
them with equal opportunity in the workplace.”).  The same access limitation has consistently 
been used by lower courts to exempt the terms of health insurance plans from the ADA.  For 
example, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion bearing a striking resemblance to Justice Scalia’s 
argument that “[i]f a shoe store wishes to sell shoes only in pairs, it may,” Martin, 532 U.S. at 
699 (Scalia, J., dissenting), stated that “a store is not required to alter its inventory in order to 
stock goods such as Braille books that are especially designed for disabled people.”  Doe v. Mut. 
of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999).  By the same token, as long as all plan 
beneficiaries are offered a health plan, they cannot claim discrimination under the ADA, even if 
the plan exempts coverage for treatments necessary for their disability—thus enacting a legal 
regime of covering by exempting from their rights the ability to demand insurance coverage 
necessary for them to engage in acts constitutive of their disability status.  See id. at 560; Ford v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 
F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 
1996); Krauel v. Iowa  Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1996); Winslow v. IDS 
Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557, 566 (D. Minn. 1998); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of 
Del., 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996).  For a more complete discussion of how the legal 
treatment of health insurance under the ADA creates a regime of covering, see generally Cole, 
supra note 10. 
 96. 536 U.S. 73 (2002). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000). 
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because it believed the individual posed a threat only to his own health or 
safety.98 
The “threat-to-self” language appeared in EEOC regulations interpreting 
the ADA;99 the Court’s opinion therefore focused on whether the regulation 
constituted a permissible interpretation of the statutory directive that the direct 
threat defense applies to threats to others.100  The interpretive arguments, 
however, mask a much greater concernthreat to personal autonomy and the 
very choice of how to conduct oneself as a person with a disability.  In holding 
that an employer can fire an employee with a disability because that person 
chooses to engage in conduct that might threaten her own health or safety, the 
Court required the very essence of covering.  Choosing how to live with one’s 
disability is plainly central to one’s autonomy and status as a person with a 
disability; by framing the issue only as one of allowing someone else to curb 
conduct, the Court missed this very point.101  Echazabal is not about limiting 
 
 98. Echazabal,  536 U.S. at 76. 
 99. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2004). 
 100. The Court considered the fact that the EEOC had promulgated an identical regulation 
interpreting the provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the precursor to the ADA.  
Echazabal argued that because Congress was aware of the EEOC’s Rehabilitation Act regulatory 
language and chose not to include the threat to self clause, it plainly intended that threat-to-self 
not be an affirmative defense under the ADA.  Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 79–80.  Professor Samuel 
Bagenstos has taken issue with the Court’s claim that, because the ADA is to be construed 
consistently with the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (2000), and because the 
regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act include threat-to-self language, Congress must 
have intended to incorporate that regulation as well.  He argues that: 
the Court was simply wrong to assert that the EEOC’s threat-to-self regulation under the 
Rehabilitation Act represented an interpretation of the “direct threat” language in that 
earlier statute.  To the contrary, that regulation expressly purported to interpret the 
Rehabilitation Act’s requirement that the plaintiff be “qualified” for the position he or she 
seekswhile the statutory “direct threat” provisions appeared in a portion of the statute 
that defined the term “handicapped person.” 
Bagenstos, supra note 54, at 933–34. 
 101. The Court’s analogy to Typhoid Mary illustrates just how far off the mark it was in 
considering the threat-to-self defense as consistent with the ADA’s goal of status protection. The 
Court asked rhetorically, “[i]f Typhoid Mary had come under the ADA, would a meat packer 
have been defenseless if Mary had sued after being turned away?” Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84.  
Their point was that an employer ought to be able to protect more people than just the “others in 
the workplace” specified by the statutory language.  See id.  The example, however, is simply not 
analogous; while Typhoid Mary plainly posed a serious risk to the health of many other people, it 
is unlikely that the hypothetical employer turned her away because of the risk she posed to her 
own health.  Limiting conduct that threatens the health or safety of other people may be 
justifiable; requiring people with disabilities to cease conduct when it poses no such risks to 
others has no reason other than the regulation of the self, requiring covering that amounts to 
status discrimination. 
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an insignificant act; it casts into doubt the very status protection that is 
considered uncontroversial.102 
The Court’s covering cases thus take the limited status protections 
recognized in the closeting cases and circumscribe the conduct in which those 
people who still fall within the ADA’s protections can engage.  The 
status/conduct distinction created by Bowers and Romer in the context of 
sexual orientation discrimination explains the ways in which the Court has 
restricted the reach of the ADA and entrenched the limited societal acceptance 
of people with disabilities. 
Yet the inconsistency between these two sets of casesthose announcing a 
preference for the closet and those denying coverage to people with disabilities 
in the closetdemands explanation.  Just as the Court announced its 
abandonment of the status/conduct dichotomy for lesbians and gay men in 
Lawrence, so Lawrence presents an opportunity to consider a new way to 
examine the Court’s ADA cases.  The private/public dichotomy with which the 
Lawrence Court replaced the status/conduct one presents an appropriate 
framework for similarly re-examining the ADA cases and in fact provides a 
more intellectually satisfying explanation of the Court’s apparent inconsistency 
in its creation of the disability closet. 
II.  LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND CONSTRUCTING DISABILITY STATUS AS A PRIVATE 
ACT 
The Court recognized the artificiality of the status/conduct legal distinction 
in Lawrence v. Texas.103  As the Lawrence Court put it, “To say that the issue 
in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans 
the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple 
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual 
intercourse.”104  Rather, the Court declared, “[w]hen homosexual conduct is 
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an 
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination.”105  Lawrence thus 
changed the legal landscape but not as significantly as it might appear on a 
surface reading of the opinion.106  In place of the limiting status/conduct 
 
 102. See Ball, supra note 95, at 960 (contrasting nondiscrimination/equal treatment approach 
to discrimination with the reasonable accommodation mandate of the ADA, which has met with 
greater resistance). 
 103. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 104. Id. at 567. 
 105. Id. at 575. 
 106. See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2004) (calling Lawrence “an about-face in the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution’s application to the lives and practices of gay men and lesbians” 
but going on to question the limits of the decision). 
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dichotomy, it erected a regime of private-conduct protection and public-
conduct discrimination. 
A. Lawrence and the Private Contours of Sexual Orientation Protection 
The first sentence of the Lawrence opinion makes the Court’s intention 
clear: “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions 
into a dwelling or other private places.”107  The majority similarly begins its 
legal analysis “by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to 
engage in the private conduct [of same-sex sodomy] in the exercise of their 
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”108 
Indeed, in overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court revisited the historical 
record that had convinced the Bowers majority that “[p]roscriptions against 
[sodomy] have ancient roots”109 and concluded that “[l]aws prohibiting 
sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in 
private.”110  The Court ultimately found Lawrence’s act of sodomy 
constitutionally protected, in large part, because it did not “involve public 
conduct.”111  It thus unmistakably limited the reach of its protection only as far 
as the walls that hide protected conduct from public view. 
But the Lawrence Court did not seek to protect all private acts.  It quite 
deliberately based its decision on the right to privacy of the Due Process 
Clause,112 despite the fact that Lawrence had made only an Equal Protection 
 
 107. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 108. Id. at 564. 
 109. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). 
 110. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569; see also id. at 570 (“The policy of punishing consenting 
adults for private acts was not much discussed in the early legal literature.  We can infer that one 
reason for this was the very private nature of the conduct. . . . [A] significant number [of 
prosecutions] involved conduct in a public place.”). 
 111. Id. at  578.  Professor Carlos A. Ball has argued forcefully that, such language 
notwithstanding, Lawrence is not about spatial privacy but about “decisional freedom.”  Carlos A. 
Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of 
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 121011 (2004).  The decisional freedom granted, 
however, seems very much limited to the private sphere, as the Court makes clear in 
distinguishing the right to engage in consensual sodomy at issue in Lawrence from the much 
more public act of state-sanctioned same-sex marriage.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also 
Franke, supra note 106, at 1403 (“[W]hile ‘[f]reedom extends beyond spatial bounds,’ the liberty 
interest at stake is one that is tethered to the domestic private.” (second alteration in original)). 
 112. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, 575 (declining to proceed under the Equal Protection 
Clause).  See also id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Rather than relying on the substantive 
component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as the Court does, I base my 
conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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argument in trial court and the Court of Appeals had decided the issue under 
both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.113 
This due process right to privacy was first announced in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,114 which the Lawrence Court read as “plac[ing] emphasis on the 
marriage relation and the protected space of the marital bedroom.”115  
Subsequently, the Lawrence Court observed Eisenstadt v. Baird116 “established 
that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends 
beyond the marital relationship” to private relationships between unmarried 
people.117  The right to privacy, then, according to the Lawrence Court, 
requires that the protected conduct occur not only in a private space but also 
within the confines of a private relationship. 
B. Lawrence and the Private Contours of Disability Protection 
This characterization extends easily to disability as well.  Just as Bowers 
and Romer created legal regimes that explained disability subordination as well 
as subordination of gay men and lesbians, so Lawrence provides a new 
framework for understanding how people with disabilities continue to face 
legally sanctioned discrimination in the face of and with the approval of the 
ADA. 
First, the protected conduct recognized by the Lawrence Court is far 
broader than the sexual conduct on which the Court originally based the right 
to privacy.  Drawing on the Eisenstadt Court’s characterization of the right to 
use contraceptives “to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child,”118 the Lawrence Court read the Roe v. Wade decision as being 
about more than childbearing choices, including “the right of a woman to make 
certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny.”119  Thus, the Lawrence 
Court concluded, it has recognized the right to privacy as protecting “personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education.”120 
 
 113. Id. at 563; see also id. at 564 (petition for certiorari including whether the statute 
violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 114. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 115. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–65. 
 116. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 117. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565, 567 (“The [challenged statutes] . . . touch[] upon the most 
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”); see also 
Ball, supra note 111, at 1212 (“The Court in Lawrence understood that the Texas sodomy statute 
implicated liberty interests associated with personal relationships as much as liberty interests 
associated with sexual conduct.”). 
 118. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
 119. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. 
 120. Id. at 573–74 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992)). 
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Such personal and frequently bodily private decisions certainly extend to 
choices about how to care for one’s disability.  While the due process cases 
cited in Lawrence concern controlling one’s ability to procreate,121 as the Court 
observed in the context of the ADA in Bragdon v. Abbott, “[r]eproduction and 
the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself.”122  If 
sexual conduct is protected, then so, surely, are such acts as decisions about 
whether to take medication,123 whether to undergo a medical procedure,124 or 
even how to ambulate.125  In short, just as Lawrence protects gay men and 
lesbians in their private sexual conduct, so its concept of legally protected 
private conduct provides a means of considering how far the ADA’s protection 
of one’s right to treat one’s own bodily disability extends.126 
The Lawrence decision’s limitation of protection for private conduct to 
that which is engaged in within a private relationship also applies to disability 
protection under the ADA.  While the first right to privacy cases concerned 
sexual conduct within a relationship with another person—a spouse in 
Griswold127 and a sexual partner to whom one is not married in Eisenstadt128—
the Court in Roe v. Wade recognized that the privacy right is grounded 
primarily in personal decisions undertaken in one’s relationship with 
oneself.129 
The Lawrence Court further considered the importance of how one’s 
personal choices affect one’s relationship with people beyond the personal and 
private as well.  In discussing the stigma that attaches to a person convicted of 
 
 121. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). 
 122. Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998). 
 123. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990). 
 124. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980). 
 125. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1982–84 (2004) (finding right of private citizens 
to sue under the ADA where state courthouse did not have wheelchair access and the only way 
wheelchair-bound plaintiffs could enter was by crawling up the stairs). 
 126. Cf. Ball, supra note 111, at 1211 (reading Lawrence broadly as protecting the 
“decisional freedom of lesbians and gay men”). 
 127. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 128. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this 
choice altogether is apparent.  Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in 
early pregnancy may be involved.  Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the 
woman a distressful life and future.  Psychological harm may be imminent.  Mental and 
physical health may be taxed by child care. . . . [T]he additional difficulties and 
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. 
Id. at 153; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (reading Roe as being about the 
right of the woman to make personal choices). 
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a felony,130 the Court acknowledged that private conduct within a private 
relationship has effects beyond that private relationship and the private space 
within which it occurs.131 According to Professor Katherine Franke, Lawrence 
and his partner Garner “might have just been tricking with each other” because 
“none of the briefing in the case indicated that they were in a relationship.”  
Rather, “the Court took it as given that Lawrence and Garner were in a 
relationship, and the fact of that relationship does important normative work in 
the opinion.” 132 
So too, conduct that a person undertakes related to her disability involves, 
like Roe, primarily a relationship with oneself, a need to balance one’s own 
possibly competing ideas about autonomy, morality, and self.  At the same 
time, these private decisions very much affect one’s relationships with other 
people.  For example, a person’s decision to employ a hook rather than a 
prosthetic designed to look like a forearm and hand because a hook provides 
greater ease in picking up objects will be judged by many people with whom 
one comes into contact, who may be disturbed, concerned, or simply curious 
about the choice. 
Most importantly, however, the Lawrence Court’s reliance on the fact that 
the conduct took place in private leaves the spectrum of the closet in place and 
undercuts any significance its abolition of the status/conduct distinction might 
seem to have.133  The majority is careful to close with the assurance that the 
case “does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition 
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”134  In other words, 
whatever Lawrence may choose to do in private, he should not expect public 
recognition; in fact, it is entirely possible that he would still face criminal 
charges if he engaged in certain conduct associated with gay men in public.135  
If acts of physical affection are conduct constitutive of Lawrence’s status as a 
gay man,136 and that conduct is protected only when hidden from the public, 
 
 130. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575–76. 
 131. See Franke, supra note 106, at 1403–04 (“But even the Court’s privacy jurisprudence has 
evolved from addressing the disclosure of matters of private concern and governmental intrusion 
into private spaces to a less situated or territorial notion of protecting a zone of personal 
autonomy and decisional privacy.”). 
 132. Id. at 1408. Indeed, it is not at all clear that Lawrence had a close personal relationship 
with the sexual partner with whom he was arrested. 
 133. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for 
Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1790–92 (1996) (discussing “the epistemological privilege of 
unknowing” in which even the Bowers dissent managed to avoid addressing Bowers’s 
homosexuality finding it “just another way of keeping homosexuals at arms length”). 
 134. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 135. See Ball, supra note 111, at 1215–16 (recognizing that Lawrence must somehow be read 
as extending rights beyond spatial privacy in order to support an argument for same-sex 
marriage). 
 136. Yoshino, supra note 65, at 874–75. 
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then, at best, the Lawrence Court is simply sanctioning a regime of covering.137  
Lawrence’s status as a gay man is protected, but to maintain protection for the 
conduct he engages in as a gay man, he must keep it hidden from the public.138 
The lesson is instructive for an understanding of disability rights.  Using 
Lawrence as a framework, one might predict that the ADA protects the rights 
of people with disabilities to make private, personal choices about how to deal 
with their disabilities.  The strong caution of the Lawrence Court that conduct 
protection for gay men and lesbians applies only in a private setting, however, 
helps explain the harsh restrictions that the Court has placed on the ADA’s 
protections as well.139  Rereading the Court’s ADA opinions with an eye to the 
private/public dichotomy illuminates why the ADA—a civil rights statute 
designed to provide public protections—in fact provides surprisingly little in 
this regard. 
III.  THE LEGAL IMPACT OF A PRIVATE-CONDUCT-PROTECTION APPROACH TO 
DISABILITY 
The private/public framework of Lawrence reveals the severe limits the 
Court has placed on the ADA’s purportedly public protections against 
discrimination.  In particular, the Lawrence dichotomy helps show how the 
Court’s reading of the ADA limits protection against disability discrimination 
to those people whose status-related conduct is confined to the private sphere.  
In the status cases, the Court focuses on private conduct to determine whether 
the individual is entitled to the public protections of the ADA.  The reasonable 
accommodation cases illustrate the Court’s reluctance to use the ADA to 
protect public conduct, much as the Lawrence Court was careful to confine its 
opinion to the very private acts at issue there. 
 
 137. See Franke, supra note 106, at 1407 (“[T]he privatized liberty of Lawrence leave[s] 
lower courts free to cabin protection of, and thus interpret, nonnormative sexualities. . . . 
Kennedy’s privatized liberty leaves a wide range of homosexual and heterosexual behaviors and 
‘lifestyles’ subject to criminalization.”).  But see Ball, supra note 111, at 1209 (“One of the 
interesting areas to watch after Lawrence will be what effect it has on other criminal laws . . . that 
have a public component to them and that have been used in the past to harass gay men.”). 
 138. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review 
to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2004) (“Lawrence only 
sets a new floor for gay people, and not the same floor that straight Americans can take for 
granted.  Lawrence gives us nothing less than, but also nothing more than, a jurisprudence of 
tolerance.”). 
 139. See id. at 1065 (“The results in Romer and Lawrence are consistent with the norm that 
homosexuality is a tolerable sexual variation, and their reasoning is more consistent with this 
norm than with the more gay-friendly idea that homosexuality is a benign sexual variation.”); 
Franke, supra note 106, at 1415 (“Lawrence is a slam-dunk victory for a politics that is 
exclusively devoted to creating safe zones for homo- and hetero-sex/intimacy, while at the same 
time rendering all other zones more dangerous for nonnormative sex.”); Yoshino, supra note 133, 
at 1799 (“The symbol of the closet is analogous to the body in that both are loci of entrapment.”). 
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A. The Private Conduct Protections of the ADA 
Read through the prism of Lawrence, Bragdon v. Abbott, as the Court’s 
first ADA decision, signals a greater concern with protecting the private 
conduct of people with disabilities than the sort of public protection associated 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Like Lawrence, Bragdon turned on an issue 
of sexuality—there, HIV status140—a distinction that in Lawrence assumed 
particular importance, as it fit comfortably within the contours of the Court’s 
substantive due process privacy cases.141 
Yet the very private nature of sexual matters presents a more complicated 
legal issue in ADA cases, as the parties and the Justices in Bragdon 
recognized.  In a matter consistent with the accepted concept of civil rights 
statutes as prohibiting public acts of discrimination, Dr. Bragdon argued that 
the ADA covers only “those aspects of a person’s life which have a public, 
economic, or daily character.”142  The Court rejected this argument because the 
applicable regulations143 state that a disability may be defined by its impact on 
activities “such as caring for one’s self [and] performing manual tasks.”144  
Therefore, a covered disability need not affect activities of “a public or 
economic character.”145 
In their dissents, both Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor heatedly 
disagreed with the notion that the ADA protects the very sorts of intimate 
sexual matters that lie at the heart of the Lawrence decision.146  Their 
disagreement highlights the majority’s implicit conclusion that disability and 
the care of one’s body is inherently a private matter.  In other words, Bragdon 
suggested that the ADA is about protecting private conduct, not the public acts 
associated with civil rights statutes. 
 
 140. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). 
 141. See supra notes 107–40 and accompanying text. 
 142. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. 
 143. The Bragdon Court relied on regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act because of 
Congress’s direction that the ADA was to be construed consistently with such regulations.  Id. at 
631–32. 
 144. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (2004); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2004). 
 145. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639 (finding “no credible basis for confining major life activities to 
those with a public, economic, or daily aspect”). 
 146. Justice Rehnquist made the distinction clear in his protest that, while “[n]o one can deny 
that reproductive decisions are important in a person’s life . . . so are decisions as to who to 
marry, where to live, and how to earn one’s living,” activities he assumed were not covered by 
the ADA.  Id. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  So, too, Justice O’Connor wrote that 
the act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part of the lives of many women, 
is not generally the same as the representative major life activities of all persons . . . listed 
in regulations relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.  Based on that 
conclusion, there is no need to address whether other aspects of intimate or family 
relationships not raised in this case could constitute major life activities. 
Id. at 664–65 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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This approach garnered unanimity on the Court in Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,147 where the private conduct 
preference created a limitation on the Act’s coverage.  There, the Court held 
that Williams did not qualify for protection under the ADA as an “individual 
with a disability” if she claimed physical limitations only at the workplace.148  
According to the Court, if one claims that her disability limits her ability to 
perform manual tasks, she “must have an impairment that prevents or severely 
restricts [her] from doing activities that are of central importance to most 
people’s daily lives.”149  Such tasks, the Court explained, must be of the same 
nature as “walking, seeing, and hearing,”150 all actions that are part of the same 
private bodily conduct as sexual activity, reproduction, and making other 
decisions about how to care for one’s body.151 
By contrast, when viewed through the lens of the private/public 
framework, Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation152 can be 
read as holding that a public act may remove one from ADA protection.  In 
Cleveland the Court concluded that because Cleveland stated on an application 
for Social Security benefits that she was unable to work it became incumbent 
upon her to explain why she remained entitled to ADA protection against 
employment discrimination.153  Just as the Court has considered the mere 
public statement of one’s homosexuality a public act that is not constitutionally 
protected,154 so Cleveland’s statement of her disability can be viewed as a 
public act, and  the Court’s imposition of an additional burden on her to show 
entitlement to ADA coverage suggests that they view the ADA as more 
protective of private than public conduct.155 
This approach also provides a more satisfying explanation of Sutton, 
Kirkingburg, and Murphy than does the status/conduct dichotomy.  The Sutton 
 
 147. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 148. Id. at 201. 
 149. Id. at 198. 
 150. Id. at 197. 
 151. Indeed, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals because the lower court had 
erred in disregarding evidence about Williams’s limitations in carrying out personal hygiene and 
household chores.  Id. at 201–02. 
 152. 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 
 153. Id. at 806. 
 154. See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 155. The Cleveland Court based its determination that such a statement should not trigger a 
legal presumption that the individual cannot claim Title I protection on the fact that Title I allows 
an individual to claim she is qualified for a position because she can perform the job’s essential 
functions with reasonable accommodation.  526 U.S. at 803.  The ADA’s guarantee that 
individuals with disabilities be given reasonable accommodations can be read as an act of public 
protection—allowing a reading of Cleveland that recognizes the ADA as protecting public 
conduct.  As explained in Part III.B., infra, however, this public conduct protection has little 
substance. 
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Court’s holding that one’s use of mitigating measures may render one’s 
disability invisible and therefore not protected may be seen as a concern with 
private acts to the exclusion of the public ones associated with civil rights 
protections.  Mitigating measures—the ingestion of medication or use of 
personal aids—surely fall within the rubric of private conduct, for they 
constitute the sort of intimate decisions connected to one’s bodily integrity 
protected by the right to privacy. 
The legally pertinent question in Sutton was whether one is still protected 
by the ADA once one engages in the private out of mitigation.156  According to 
the Sutton majority, such an act may remove one from the public protections of 
the ADA.  Justice Stevens, in his dissent, highlighted this result as “the 
counterintuitive conclusion that the ADA’s safeguards vanish when individuals 
make themselves more employable by ascertaining ways to overcome their 
physical or mental limitations.”157  In other words, the act of mitigation is 
protected because the person with a need to mitigate has a disability and is 
acting privately to take care of it; once that person steps into the public realm 
of employment, however, she may no longer claim protection by the ADA. 
This counterintuitive conclusion is even more striking in Kirkingburg, 
where the Court held that even Kirkingburg’s ability to compensate for his 
monocular vision through his own brain functions removed him from ADA 
coverage.158  Just as Lawrence suggested that lesbians and gay men have a 
right to be treated just like everyone else, provided they confine their lesbian 
and gay conduct to the privacy of their homes, so Kirkingburg shows how the 
Court wishes to treat people with disabilities just like everyone else, provided 
they keep their disability-associated conduct private as well.159  Being treated 
like everyone else, of course, means giving up the special protections of the 
ADA. 
The difference, of course, is that the ADA was enacted to provide public 
protections against disability discrimination, a federal measure woefully 
lacking for protection against sexual orientation discrimination.  While the 
private/public dichotomy in Lawrence is in part a reflection of the inadequacy 
 
 156. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding it “apparent that 
if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the 
effects of those measures . . . . must be taken into account when judging whether that person is 
‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the Act” (emphasis 
added)). 
 157. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 158. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999). 
 159. The possible exception lies in the Court’s determination that an employer may 
discriminate against an employee with a disability if it feels that the employee poses a threat to 
her own health.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 87 (2002).  That this decision 
runs counter to the Court’s right-to-privacy cases is clouded by the way the opinion is steeped 
exclusively in matters of statutory interpretation and regulatory authority. 
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of legal protections for lesbians and gay men, the dichotomy has particularly 
troubling implications when applied to the ADA, which is intended to enact 
such public protections. 
B. The Consequences of the Private Preference on the ADA’s Treatment of 
Public Conduct 
Applying the private/public framework to the Court’s ADA cases focusing 
on public conduct finally provides an explanation for this inconsistency.  The 
Court has recognized that the ADA, as a civil rights statute, is designed to 
prevent discrimination against people with disabilities “in major areas of 
public life.”160  Yet its understanding of public protection is perverted by its 
concept of the ADA as protecting private conduct of bodily integrity.  It thus 
construes cases dealing with public conduct in a way that actually reflects a 
private conduct understanding of the ADA. 
The Court’s decision last term in Tennessee v. Lane161 illustrates the limits 
of public conduct protection under the ADA.  In Lane, the Court held that the 
states, as “public entities” covered by Title II of the Act, have a responsibility 
to provide reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities.162  At the 
same time, it circumscribed the reasonable accommodation requirement in a 
way that comports with the private/public dichotomy.  That it did so in the 
arena of public entities’ ADA obligations highlights this irony. 
The State in Lane raised an Eleventh Amendment challenge to Title II’s 
authorization of private causes of action for money damages in defending itself 
against the plaintiffs’ ADA claims that it failed to provide people with 
 
 160. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001).  See also Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. 
Ct. 1978, 1984 (2004).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has regularly turned to cases decided under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in deciding ADA cases; see Martin, 532 U.S. at 681 
(“Our conclusion is consistent with case law in the analogous context of Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.”); see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 420 (2002) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (comparing the ADA’s silence on seniority systems with Title VII and the ADEA’s 
“explicit protection for seniority”); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 616–17 
(1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (using Title VII to determine whether the ADA prohibits 
discrimination between people with disabilities); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 504–06 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (comparing the ability of any person to bring suit under Title VII or the ADEA with 
the Court’s severe limitation of protected individuals under the ADA and discussing Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), a Title VII case, as an example of the need 
to construe remedial civil rights legislation broadly). 
 161. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). 
 162. Three years earlier, in Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, the Court held 
that the Eleventh Amendment barred private suits for money damages brought against the states 
under Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in employment.  531 U.S. 356, 374 
(2001).  Although Lane appears to be a victory in that it did not similarly hold Title II suits 
barred, as discussed infra, it still reflects the Court’s view of the ADA’s public conduct 
protections as extremely limited. 
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ambulatory disabilities adequate wheelchair-accessible access to a number of 
public courthouses.163  The Court held that there was a “congruence” and 
“proportionality” between states’ discrimination in the provision of public 
services and the remedy of allowing private suits for money damages under 
Title II of the ADA.164 
The Court went on, however, to address the scope of the States’ reasonable 
accommodation obligation, an issue not necessary for its resolution of the 
Eleventh Amendment challenge before it.  It cautioned that “Title II does not 
require States to employ any and all means to make judicial services accessible 
to persons with disabilities.”165  In fact, the Court viewed providing an elevator 
to allow wheelchair-bound people access to courtrooms as a remedy of last 
resort, necessary only if “a variety of less costly measures” are ineffective.166  
This discussion went far beyond the question of Congress’s power to abrogate 
the states’ sovereign immunity and strongly suggests that the Court was quite 
deliberately announcing that the reasonable accommodation obligation is a 
restrictive one, even when applied in the most public of arenas—States’ 
provision of public services.167 
 
 163. Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1982–83.  The facts of the case were particularly sympathetic and, 
importantly, concerned the most obvious of non-hidden disabilities.  One of the plaintiffs, George 
Lane, is paraplegic and uses a wheelchair.  Id. at 1982. 
[H]e was compelled to appear to answer a set of criminal charges on the second floor of a 
county courthouse that had no elevator.  At his first appearance, Lane crawled up two 
flights of stairs to get to the courtroom.  When Lane returned to the courthouse for a 
hearing, he refused to crawl again or to be carried by officers to the courtroom; he 
consequently was arrested and jailed for failure to appear.  Jones [the other plaintiff, also 
paraplegic], a certified court reporter, alleged that she has not been able to gain access to a 
number of county courthouses, and, as a result, has lost both work and an opportunity to 
participate in the judicial process. 
Id. at 1982–83. 
 164. Id. at 1993. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1993–94. 
 167. In Barnes v. Gorman, the Court held that punitive damages are not available in private 
suits brought under Title II of the ADA.  536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002).  The Court based its 
conclusion on the fact that Title II provides that its remedies are the same as those available for 
violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits disability discrimination by 
recipients of federal funding.  Id. at 189 n.3; see also 42 U.S.C.§ 12133 (2000).  The 
Rehabilitation Act, in turn, incorporates the remedies available for violations of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race discrimination by recipients of federal funding.  
Barnes, 536 U.S. at 189 n.3.  The Court reasoned that, using contract principles, punitive 
damages are not available for violations of statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under 
the Spending Clause except for intentional violations of clear and unambiguous prohibitions.  Id. 
at 182.  Therefore, according to the Barnes Court, “[b]ecause punitive damages may not be 
awarded in private suits under Title VI [of the 1964 Civil Rights Act], it follows that they may 
not be awarded in suits under [Title II] of the ADA.”  Id.  The fault in the Court’s reasoning is 
that the ADA was not enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under the Spending Clause but 
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The Court, in fact, took this approach as early as 1999, only the second 
term in which it heard any ADA cases.  In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 
the question was whether Title II requires state programs to place people with 
mental disabilities in community settings for which they qualify rather than 
institutions.168  In addressing the limits of the State’s obligations, the Court 
held that the determination of a public entity’s nondiscrimination obligation 
must be made in the context of the State’s allocation of its resources.169  “To 
maintain a range of facilities and to administer services with an even hand,” 
the Court opined, “the State must have more leeway than the courts below 
understood.”170  The provision of public programs, according to the Olmstead 
Court, does not require the accommodation of any and all public conduct by 
people with disabilities; rather, the states are free to determine what kinds of 
status-related conduct to support. 
The private/public dichotomy thus comes into full relief in Olmstead.  The 
reasonable accommodation mandate of the ADA—Congress’s express 
requirement that people with disabilities be protected beyond the right to 
engage in their own private conduct—is in fact limited by the very public 
nature of such accommodations.171 
The private/public framework similarly helps explain the Court’s decision 
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, in which a unanimous Court held that an 
employer may discriminate against an employee with a disability if it believes 
the employee presents a risk to her own health or safety,172 contrary to the 
plain language of the statute.173  Certainly, one’s choices about how to conduct 
oneself as a person with a disability—including what physical risks to expose 
oneself to174—seem to be the most private of actions.  Yet, under the Lawrence 
 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; the underlying reasoning that a recipient of federal 
funding accepts its terms when it accepts the funding simply does not apply to the ADA.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000). 
 168. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). 
 169. Id. at 604. 
 170. Id. at 605.  The specific legal issue in the opinion concerned the “fundamental-
alteration” defense raised to thwart the obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation.  Id. at 
604. 
 171. See id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“No State has unlimited resources, and each 
must make hard decisions on how much to allocate to treatment of diseases and 
disabilities. . . . The judgment, however, is a political one and not within the reach of the 
statute.”). 
 172. Cheveron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002). 
 173. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000) (allowing the employer to use the defense of 
qualification standards, including the “requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat 
to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”). 
 174. Echazabal suffered from Hepatitis C; any number of activities could have exposed him 
to risk, yet he was free to ignore such risks everywhere but at his place of work.  Echazabal, 536 
U.S. at 76. 
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Court’s rubric of privacy as a spatial concept confined to a private space,175  
Echazabal’s choice of a workplace and a specific job within that workplace is 
an unprotected public act.  This approach would be consistent with Congress’s 
directive in the ADA that an employer need not hire or retain an employee in a 
position in which she poses a “direct threat to the health or safety of other 
individuals in the workplace,”176 for the risk posed to other people takes one’s 
conduct beyond the realm of choosing how to act for oneself and presents 
possible harm to others.177  In expanding the scope of the direct threat defense 
to the employee’s threat to her own health or safety, however, the Court cut 
even more deeply into the realm of private conduct. 
While the Echazabal opinion interferes with the most private of conduct, it 
does so by reposing the issue as one of public conduct.  Ironically, far from the 
public aspect of the conduct lending it greater protection under a civil rights 
statute supposedly designed to do just that, the public dimension robbed 
Echazabal of even the right to engage in private conduct within a public space.  
This line of reasoning, followed far enough, could neuter every public 
protection the ADA purports to provide. 
The best way to examine how far this proposition carries is by examining 
the Court’s cases exclusively devoted to the reasonable accommodation 
requirement. In a covered entity’s obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation lies the confluence of public and private, Congress’s 
recognition that the anti-discrimination mandate of the ADA is meaningless 
unless others engage in conduct related to that individual’s disability.178  In 
other words, if an individual’s decisions about how to act as a person with a 
disability are the very nature of private conduct, the reasonable 
accommodation requirement, with its mandate that entities other than the 
individual herself take action to make it possible for her to conduct herself in 
public, seems destined to receive less than full expression in a legal regime 
ruled by the private/public dichotomy. 
In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,179 the Court considered whether a 
workplace seniority system trumps the ADA’s requirement that an employer 
make reasonable accommodations to the needs of an employee with a 
disability.  The Court began by explaining that neutral workplace rules are not 
 
 175. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 176. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000). 
 177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (distinguishing between a duty 
created by one’s own acts and the rule that one has no duty to act affirmatively to prevent harm 
befalling others). 
 178. Ball, supra note 95, at 955 (“The most important principle of disability discrimination 
law, namely, that of reasonable accommodation . . . operates under a difference model of equality, 
one which acknowledges that differential treatment of disabled individuals is often necessary in 
order to provide them with equal opportunity in the workplace.”). 
 179. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). 
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necessarily beyond the reach of the ADA;180 hence, the ADA apparently does 
extend into the public realm of conduct that affects other people.  The Court 
almost immediately dispelled this notion, however, by cautioning that “a 
demand for an effective accommodation could prove unreasonable [and 
therefore not required by the ADA] because of its impact . . . on fellow 
employees.”181  Therefore, the Barnett Court held, “ordinarily” it would not be 
“reasonable” to allow an employee with a disability to take a position that 
makes it possible for him to work if another employee has seniority rights to 
the same position.182  The reason, the Court made clear, is because of the 
impact such an accommodation would have on other employees’ 
expectations.183 
Hence, according to the Barnett Court, the ADA does not protect public 
conduct that has an impact on other people.  The Court thus described publicly 
protected rights that have no real substance.  Apparently, the Court believed 
that the ADA requires a reasonable accommodation that will allow an 
employee to perform her job only if it does not at the same time disturb other 
employees.184  In this sense, the accommodation is closer to the employee’s 
own private conduct—the things she does to function with her disability that 
remain within the scope of her private autonomy—than to the sort of public 
conduct that the ADA should protect. 
This reasoning applies equally to the Martin opinion,185 despite the fact 
that the Court held that the PGA did in fact have to accommodate Martin by 
waiving its no-golf-cart rule and allowing him to use a cart during the final 
stage of the tournament’s qualifying rounds.  PGA did not contest the fact that 
the golf cart was a reasonable accommodation in that it was a necessary means 
of allowing Martin, afflicted with a disability that made it painful and 
dangerous for him to walk even the short distance from a golf cart to the 
green,186 to play.187  The Court’s inquiry, therefore, focused on whether the 
 
 180. Id. at 398. 
 181. Id. at 400.  Justice Scalia would apparently remove from ADA protection any public 
conduct, whether or not it actually or potentially impacts other individuals.  In his Barnett dissent, 
he argued that “reasonable accommodations” include changes only to policies “that the 
employee’s disability prevents him from observing.”  Id. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 182. Id. at 403. 
 183. Id. at 404. 
 184. In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor highlighted this point, explaining that she 
believed the “relevant issue is whether the seniority system prevents the position in question from 
being vacant. . . . [A] vacant position is a position in which no employee currently works and to 
which no individual has a legal entitlement.” Barnett, 535 U.S. at 409 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 185. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
 186. Martin has Klippel–Trenaunay–Weber Syndrome, 
a degenerative circulatory disorder that obstructs the flow of blood from his right leg back 
to his heart. . . . [I]t causes severe pain and has atrophied his right leg. . . . Walking not 
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golf cart constituted a “fundamental alteration” to the competition itself, in 
which case the PGA would not be required to provide it.188 
The Court quickly dismissed the notion that a waiver of the no-golf-cart 
rule would fundamentally alter the game of golf, for “the use of carts is not 
itself inconsistent with the fundamental character of the game of golf”189 and, 
indeed, the PGA allows the use of golf carts in many of its tournaments and in 
the first two of the three-round tournament in which Martin was playing.190  As 
to the PGA’s argument that the waiver would fundamentally alter the nature of 
the particular competition in which Martin was engaged, the Court held that 
the rule in fact did not have any substantial effect on the competition.191 
Most important, however, the Court emphasized that allowing Martin to 
use a golf cart would have no appreciable effect on any of the other tournament 
participants.  According to the district court, Martin “easily endures greater 
fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied competitors do by walking.”192  In 
other words, the accommodation can be viewed as akin to private conduct—it 
allows Martin, as a person with a mobility impairment, to move around the 
golf course—and does not affect other people in a way that would require the 
Court to take a less restrictive public conduct protection stance. 
The ADA cases dealing with public acts—reasonable accommodations and 
choice of workplace—illustrate how the Court’s approach to the ADA has led 
to a limited reading based on an implicit assumption that the ADA really 
protects only private conduct of the sort associated with directly caring for 
 
only cause[s] him pain, fatigue, and anxiety, but also create[s] a significant risk of 
hemorrhaging, developing blood clots, and fracturing his tibia so badly than an 
amputation might be required. 
Id. at 668. 
 187. Id. at 682. 
 188. Title III of the ADA (covering public accommodations), under which the Martin case 
was brought, includes in its definition of discrimination, “a failure to make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures . . . unless the entity can demonstrate that 
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”  42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).  
Title I (covering employment) contains a parallel provision in § 12112(b)(5)(A) (allowing a 
defense of “undue hardship”), as do the regulations implementing Title II (public entities).  28 
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2001). 
 189. Martin, 532 U.S. at 683. 
 190. Id. at 685–86. 
 191. Id. at 687–88 (citing district court’s finding “that the fatigue from walking during one of 
petitioner’s 4-day tournaments cannot be deemed significant”; that, according to one of Martin’s 
expert witnesses, “the calories expended in walking a golf course (about five miles) [is] 
approximately 500 calories—‘nutritionally less than a Big Mac,’” and “is expended over a 5-hour 
period, during which golfers have numerous intervals for rest and refreshment”; and that “the 
majority of golfers in petitioner’s tournaments have chosen to walk, often to relieve stress or for 
other strategic reasons”). 
 192. Id. at 690 (quoting Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F.Supp. 1242, 1252 (D. Or. 1998)). 
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one’s own disability.  The feedback loop thus depends, not on the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, despite the Court’s express and conscious reliance on that statute, 
but rather on its unexamined treatment of gay men and lesbians.  Just as 
lesbian/gay identity is unavoidably tied to conduct and therefore, under 
Lawrence, that conduct must be cabined to the private sphere, so disability 
status is intricately bound up in associated conduct.  Although the ADA is 
designed to protect public conduct, the Court has approached it with the same 
assumption that private conduct is all that deserves legal protection.  The 
public aspects of the Act thus lose their substance and people with disabilities, 
like gay men and lesbians, receive only protection from discrimination against 
them based on their very status.  The civil rights protections of the ADA afford 
people with disabilities no significantly greater public conduct protection than 
that given to gay men and lesbians, who have no such declared civil rights. 
CONCLUSION 
One would ordinarily expect the ADA’s feedback loop to be generated 
primarily by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on which it was modeled in so many 
respects.  Indeed, in his symposium piece, Professor Days gives thoughtful 
attention to the ways in which the relationship between the two has influenced 
the Civil Rights Act.193  Yet the Supreme Court’s crabbed interpretation of the 
ADA cannot be squared with the public anti-discrimination model of the Civil 
Rights Act.  Despite language to the contrary, the Court’s approach to the 
ADA must be explained by reference to something else. 
The Lawrence decision provides that reference point.  While rejecting the 
old status/conduct framework for defining the parameters of constitutional 
protections accorded to lesbians and gay men, Lawrence erected a new mode 
of circumscribing societal and legal acceptance of such individuals. The 
private/public dichotomy that underlies the Lawrence decision and brings to 
the surface the extreme limits of the civil rights protections announced by the 
Court provides a similar caution in approaching ADA protections for the civil 
rights of people with disabilities. 
Certainly, the Court has never drawn on issues of constitutional protection 
for gay men and lesbians to interpret the ADA; that has never been my claim.  
Rather, the private/public dichotomy provides a paradigm—a framework that 
can be used to analyze the unspoken and often unthinking assumptions that 
inform what the members of the Court undoubtedly think is a strictly legal 
approach to interpreting the statute’s reach.  Through that framework, we can 
begin to understand both why the Court has so frequently disappointed the 
hopes of disability rights advocates and why even the victories ultimately ring 
hollow. 
 
 193. See generally Drew S. Days, III, “Feedback Loop”: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its 
Progeny, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981 (2005). 
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The ADA has a proud legacy in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and I would 
still love to see the day forty years from now when we can look back and say 
that the ADA has accomplished far more good than it has provided 
disappointment.  Yet the Court repeatedly departs from the ADA’s civil rights 
legacy because of the inherent private nature of disability.  By focusing on the 
private conduct associated with disability, the Court ends up with a skewed 
view of the public, and in the end perverts the meaning of civil rights for 
people with disabilities.  In its ADA cases, the Court has accorded to people 
with disabilities a very separate kind of equal opportunity. 
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